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INTRODUCTION 
 
Devastating violent acts committed by criminals and intrusive surveillance conducted by 
government officials have each stirred public outcry and prompted subsequent legal reforms to 
surveillance programs. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 
represented an incredible compromise to facilitate aggressive law enforcement while protecting 
civil liberties.2 A decade later, Congress carefully tailored the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA) to restrict aggressive government surveillance to foreign targets while increasing 
protections for Americans potentially impacted by the surveillance.3   FISA bridges the gap 
between classified intelligence operations and transparent criminal and diplomatic remedies. 
While all three branches of government have developed an effective tool against foreign 
adversaries through amended legislation, enabling executive orders, and interpreting cases, both 
the government and defendants ultimately face a lose-lose situation with FISA. For the 
government, FISA prosecutions fail to adequately protect sensitive law enforcement techniques. 
For defendants, FISA prosecutions fail to provide the typical adversarial protections expected in 
a criminal proceeding.  
 
CLEARED PUBLIC DEFENDER RECOMMENDATION 
 
Congress should fund at least one federal public defender who would maintain a security 
clearance in order to review classified FISA information used to prosecute defendants. That 
cleared public defender would safeguard sensitive information while ensuring that defendants 
receive robust legal representation. Justice Stevens warned against assuming that law 
enforcement could simultaneously accomplish its primary mission while still advocating for 
defendants, cautioning, “I doubt that it is possible for one to wear the hat of an effective adviser 
to a criminal defendants while at the same time wearing the hat of a law enforcement authority.”4  
 
Instead of relying on the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), national security 
prosecutors, and federal district court judges to protect a defendant’s rights as a collateral duty, a 
dedicated federal public defender would make that protection his or her primary duty. Depending 
on the funding appropriated by Congress and a defendant’s preference, a cleared public defender 
could represent the defendant through the entire process or only for discovery and pretrial 
motions. In a bifurcated process, the cleared public defender would be able to review all 
classified information obtained through discovery and filter it into unclassified recommendations 
to the defendant’s other attorney. 
                                                 
2 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat.197 (codified as amended in 18 
U.S.C. §2510-2522). 
3 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §1801 (1978).  
4 Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 310 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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HISTORIC NEED FOR SURVEILLANCE REGULATION 
 
Before regulating the specifics of modern foreign intelligence surveillance, Congress first 
evaluated the Fourth and Fifth Amendment ramifications of emerging, Prohibition-era 
surveillance techniques. Following the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Olmstead v. US, 
277 U.S. 438 (1928) –– which held that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because the 
telephonic eavesdropping was not a physical seizure; and, thus, no Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination resulted from the legal eavesdropping –– Congress enacted the 1934 Federal 
Communications Act, 5 creating the Federal Communications Commission and the regulatory 
basis for future rules on modern communications.6 However, these new regulations only applied 
to federal surveillance activities, which at the time were far fewer than state surveillance 
operations.7 The Supreme Court had not yet ruled on Mapp v. Ohio, the case that extended 
Fourth Amendment protection to state action through the Fourteenth Amendment due process 
provisions.8 Not surprisingly, early surveillance regulations only attempted to create a general 
framework, without distinguishing between the parties targeted or the content at issue. 
Subsequent legislation, particularly FISA, proved to be more contentious because it 
distinguished the parties targeted and the content regulated under the new law.9  
 
Congress considered the “intimate relation” between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, as 
illegally obtained evidence could coerce someone into a confession.10 Many interpreting cases 
addressed bootlegging during the Prohibition.11 Curiously, while the Fourth Amendment still 
plays a prominent role in surveillance analysis, courts have not expanded the Fifth Amendment 
analysis on the rights of the accused. Perhaps this is because surveillance is a preliminary 
investigative activity that may not lead to an ultimate charging and determination of guilt. If a 
suspect typically has no representation while police obtain a warrant, then no additional 
protection would be created for a suspect in a similar, but secret, surveillance warrant process.  
 
Another distinguishing factor is that the 1920s cases mostly involved alcohol and corrupting 
morals.12 In these cases, a suspect should have been able to challenge that characterization of 
immoral behavior early in the proceedings. Subsequent cases involving high-risk national 
security matters place a higher priority on first investigating and disrupting the threat before 
giving the suspect an opportunity to present a defense. However, once law enforcement has 
mitigated the threat, defendants should be able to fully challenge the investigative methods and 
evidence gathered for the subsequent prosecution. To be clear, ex parte proceedings to obtain a 
warrant should allow law enforcement the desirable upper hand to respond to a threat (real or 
                                                 
5 47 U.S.C §151 (1996).  
6 47 U.S.C. §11 (1988).  
7 See generally Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62-63 (1967).   
8 Mapp v. Ohio, 376 U.S. 643 (1961). 
9 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §1801 (1978).  
10 Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights on the Judiciary, 87th 
Cong. (1962), 
http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.uwyo.edu/congressional/docview/t21.d22.cmp-1962-sjs-0010. 
11 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §1801 (1978). 
12 See e.g. Olmstead v. US, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); See Nardine v. US, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). 
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perceived), while criminal trials should fully empower the defendant to rebut those earlier 
presumptions and force the government to carry its burden of proof. 
  
FROM TITLE III TO FISA: THE NEED FOR SURVEILLANCE AND OVERSIGHT 
 
Congress drafted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 in 
deference to the constitutional standards promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in 
deciding Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), which held that a New York state law 
permitting sweeping surveillance and allowing new surveillance devices was too broad, and Katz 
v. United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which held that the defendant had an expectation of 
privacy in using a telephone booth and that the government’s electronic surveillance violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights.13 The Berger Court distinguished aggressive state use of surveillance 
for investigations and prosecutions from the waning federal use of surveillance in prosecutions: 
“We are also advised by the Solicitor General of the United States that the Federal Government 
has abandoned the use of electronic eavesdropping for ‘prosecutorial purposes.’”14 The Solicitor 
General’s characterization of diminishing use of surveillance in federal prosecutions would be 
proven incorrect in the coming decades, especially given the increased number of tools against 
foreign adversaries allowed by FISA. The Berger Court, however, correctly predicted the 
increased use of surveillance devices and their impact on investigations and individual rights:  
 
Despite these actions of the Federal Government there has been no failure of law 
enforcement in that field . . . [T]he fantastic advances in the field of electronic 
communication constitute a great danger to the privacy of the individual; . . . 
indiscriminate use of such devices in law enforcement raises grave constitutional 
questions under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments . . . While the requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment are not inflexible, or obtusely unyielding to the legitimate 
needs of law enforcement . . . it is not asking too much that officers be required to 
comply with the basic command of the Fourth Amendment before the innermost 
secrets of one's home or office are invaded. Few threats to liberty exist which are 
greater than that posed by the use of eavesdropping devices.15  
  
The majority in Katz held that none of the delineated exceptions to the Fourth Amendment (hot 
pursuit, action incident to arrest, consensual act) applied, because the placing of a surveillance 
device required some forethought.16 Justice White disagreed in his concurring opinion, stating 
that the Court should recognize a warrant exception for certain national security matters: “We 
should not require the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of the 
United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of 
national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.” 17  Justice Douglas 
disagreed with allowing the President or Attorney General to make that decision:  
                                                 
13 S. Rep. No. 95-604, pt.1, at 3914 (1978), 
http://www.cnss.org/data/files/Surveillance/FISA/Cmte_Reports_on_Original_ Act/SJC_FISA_Report_95-604.pdf.  
14 Berger v. N.Y., 388 U.S. 41, 62 (1967).  
15 Id. at 62-63.  
16 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967).   
17 Id. at 364.  
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The President and Attorney General are properly interested parties, cast in the role 
of adversary, in national security cases. They may even be the intended victims of 
subversive action. Since spies and saboteurs are as entitled to the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment as suspected gamblers like petitioner, I cannot agree that 
where spies and saboteurs are involved adequate protection of Fourth Amendment 
rights is assured when the President and Attorney General assume both the 
position of adversary-and-prosecutor and disinterested, neutral magistrate . . . . 
Article III, § 3, gives "treason" a very narrow definition and puts restrictions on 
its proof. But the Fourth Amendment draws no lines between various substantive 
offenses.18  
  
Subsequent surveillance laws did not distinguish between the seriousness of offenses as 
suggested by Justice Douglas. Instead, FISA, as enacted, simply provided a secure venue to 
determine the reasonableness of a warrant and protect sensitive information, without making a 
determination of the seriousness of the alleged offense.19 Justice Douglas correctly predicted 
how FISA would blur the line between prosecutors and judges. Creating a designated public 
defender to review all classified surveillance on behalf of defendants would restore some balance 
between the initial gathering of evidence and a later ruling on its admissibility.  
 
Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 almost five years after 
President Kennedy’s assassination, suggesting that the law was more than just an impulsive 
reaction to the national tragedy. In 1967, eavesdropping concerns focused on private detectives 
and other non-governmental use of emerging wiretapping technologies. The resulting legislation 
gave the government an exclusive right to eavesdrop on the public, with a civil penalty available 
in lawsuits against private investigators and other potential violators. 20  This raises several 
concerns. The government monopoly on surveillance suggests that only private investigators 
would violate an individual’s privacy. The legislative history did not consider the potential for 
government intrusions on an individual’s privacy.21 While the civil remedy was intended for use 
against individual violators in a private capacity, perhaps an enterprising litigator could 
repurpose it for suits against agency officials and even the investigators who personally conduct 
questionable surveillance. Having a designated public defender to review all FISA materials used 
in prosecutions would provide a more accurate picture of any government overreach. The current 
system only reveals this information if the trial court judge rules that a defendant should see that 
information. Otherwise, defendants and the public might never realize the overreach of a 
particular investigation. Unlike bulk data collection targeting entire segments of the population, 
FISA investigations disproportionately impact the particular individual or group prosecuted.  
 
                                                 
18 Id. at 360.  
19 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1978).  
20 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat.197 (codified as amended in 42 
U.S.C § 3711). 
21 Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights on the Judiciary, 87th 
Cong. (1962), 
http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.uwyo.edu/congressional/docview/t21.d22.cmp-1962-sjs-0010. 
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NATIONAL SECURITY INTRUSIONS INTO PRIVACY INTERESTS 
 
Congressional consideration of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 dodged 
some of the difficult questions emerging in the 1960s, like failing to make a bright-line 
distinction between domestic and foreign targets. Ideally, private citizens and groups covered 
under the First Amendment would enjoy the full protection of the Constitution and other laws, 
but foreign and subversive enemies would be excluded. Deferring to the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Communist Party, U.S.A. v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961), which 
held that even domestic communist groups fall under the umbrella of a hostile foreign group, 
Congress carefully avoided delineating the line between overlapping domestic and foreign 
targets.22 
 
Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to provide federal 
support for state and local law enforcement. Title I of the Act provided for Department of Justice 
grants and the funding of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) National Academy at 
Quantico, Virginia for education and training of police chiefs.23 Title II of the Act attempted to 
restrict Miranda rights.24 At first glance, Title III of the Act seemingly restricted the use of 
surveillance techniques. A closer reading reveals that the Act carves out a broad exception to 
combat foreign threats: 
 
Nothing contained in this chapter . . . shall limit the constitutional power of the 
President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation 
against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain 
foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United 
States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence 
activities . . . . The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by 
authority of the President in the exercise of the foregoing powers may be received 
in evidence in any trial hearing, or other proceeding only where such interception 
was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or disclosed except as necessary 
to implement that power.25   
 
This broad exception –– legislated for executive power –– speaks to the concerns of the time. 
Fighting foreign adversaries, especially communists, was a national priority that overshadowed 
other civil rights concerns. However, the broad exception still remained deferential to the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. This foreshadowed future FISA legislation and cases 
that evaluated government surveillance based upon its reasonableness. This broad executive 
authority also illustrates the swinging pendulum of laws in the United States: As one law granted 
extensive powers, subsequent abuses of those powers motivated Congress, the judiciary, and 
even the president to later reign in those powers under public pressure. Future FISA amendments 
                                                 
22 See id.  
23 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat.197 (codified as amended in 42 
U.S.C § 3711).  
24 Id. (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C §3501).  
25 See id. (codified as amended in 34 U.S.C. §10110). 
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to create a permanent public defender would satisfy both government and privacy interests by 
limiting publicity and providing increased government accountability during prosecutions.  
 
The 1972 Keith court (United States v. United States Dist. Court) further explored Title III 
presidential powers within the realm of national security. The Court stated that its holding did 
not limit presidential powers to monitor foreign targets but instead focused on limitations against 
domestic suspects, especially groups participating in protected First Amendment activities:  
 
National security cases, moreover, often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth 
Amendment values not present in cases of "ordinary" crime. Though the 
investigative duty of the executive may be stronger in such cases, so also is there 
greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech . . . History abundantly 
documents the tendency of Government –– however benevolent and benign its 
motives –– to view with suspicion those who most fervently dispute its policies. 
Fourth Amendment protections become [all] the more necessary when the targets 
of official surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political 
beliefs. Senator Hart addressed this dilemma in the floor debate on § 2511 (3):  
  
As I read it –– and this is my fear –– we are saying that the President, on his 
motion, could declare –– name your favorite poison –– draft dodgers, Black 
Muslims, the Ku Klux Klan, or civil rights activists to be a clear and present 
danger to the structure or existence of the Government.26  
 
 The Court’s analysis suggests a “know it when I see it” distinction expected from the President 
and law enforcement to respect First Amendment activities while aggressively responding to 
foreign threats. The fact that the FBI, under then Director J. Edgar Hoover, responded to 
legitimate civil rights activities as a part of the perceived communist threat, 27 indicates that 
executives failed to make the correct distinction expected by the court. This extensive history of 
abuse calls for increased protections in the form of a dedicated public defender who would weigh 
in on First Amendment distinctions without disclosing sensitive techniques to nefarious groups. 
 
Recognizing growing abuses in domestic investigations, Senator Frank Church conducted 
extensive hearings to document the scope of intrusions. Senior Justice Department officials, 
including the Assistant Attorney General, readily conceded that abuses of power, approved by 
the Attorney General, had been committed, including the wiretapping of Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr.: 
 
Mr. SCHWARZ: All right. Now turning to the terms under which the taps were 
actually put on in October, or authorized in October, would you turn to the 
document dated October 10, 1963, and read into the record the first sentence of 
the fourth paragraph, please.   
  
                                                 
26 United States v. United States D., 407 U.S. 297, 313-314 (1972). 
27 Jen Christensen, The FBI’s secret memos show an agency obsessed with “neutraliz(ing)” MLK, CNN (Nov. 14, 
2014, 7:20PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/14/us/fbi-and-mlk/.  
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Mr. EVANS [reading]. "After this discussion, the Attorney General said he 
thought we should go ahead with the technical coverage on King on a trial basis, 
and to continue it if productive results were forthcoming."28  
  
The Assistant Attorney General conceded the widespread abuses, but explained that much of the 
problem stemmed from a lack of clear rules governing the limits on investigations and called for 
Congress and the President to provide robust guidelines and oversight:  
 
The approach I would like to take in testifying is not to contribute to the litany of 
condemnation of past abuses by the FBI. I think, given the committee's 
investigation to date, we are in a position to stipulate abuse. The question really is 
what should be done about the abuse now so as to avoid it in the future.   
 
The nature of the problem facing the committee is, I believe, inherent in any free 
society. It is an examination of tension that exists between individual rights and 
the common good and it calls for Government to strike a balance between them. 
How that balance is struck depends among other things on our Constitution, the 
will of Congress, the individual making the decision, and the historical moment in 
which the decision is made. These hearings have focused attention on how the 
FBI has for decades failed to weigh properly individual rights in seeking to 
protect their perception of the common good. To attempt to place all of the blame 
for the abuse on the FBI or on J. Edgar Hoover is in my opinion to fail to face the 
fact that both the Congress and the executive branch ignored a fundamental 
concern of the Founding Fathers of this country and permitted too much 
unchecked power to accumulate in one man's hands.   
  
I think the fact that Hoover greatly abused his power is true. But to paraphrase the 
old adage, when we consider his opportunities we must marvel at this moderation. 
For more than 40 years he reigned supreme, virtually unchecked by either the 
executive or legislative branches. 25  
 
This criticism of unchecked power rings as true today as it did in 1975. While convenient to 
criticize the agents who carry out surveillance mandates, logically the public should also fault 
Congress and the President for allowing such widespread programs to function. These 
programmatic decisions require careful judgment calls on how to balance civil rights with robust 
security programs. The testimony explained that surveillance overreach was not the product of 
nefarious officials but rather of unchecked powers. Creating a dedicated public defender position 
would add an additional, adversarial layer of accountability. The Assistant Attorney General’s 
call for increased guidelines and governmental accountability in achieving that desired balance 
finally came to fruition in 1978.29 
 
                                                 
28 Intelligence Activities: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., 168 (1976), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94intelli 
gence_activities_VI.pdf. 
29 Id. at 258.  
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THE HISTORIC FISA COMPROMISE 
 
The 1978 FISA Conference Report discussed many of the Church Committee concerns. 30 
Members of Congress wanted assurances that the program would only target foreign nationals 
and not unpopular domestic political activists. Congress was divided about whether to evaluate 
secret warrants throughout the existing federal judiciary or to create one centralized FISA court. 
Congress ultimately agreed to create one central court, a “unique historical consensus-supported 
by everyone from the FBI and CIA to the ACLU.”31 Congressional opinion on the proposed 
FISA court ranged from celebration over the fact that the bill joined “often disparate thoughts 
into one well-crafted piece of legislation supported by practically all of the thinking elements of 
our society," to criticism that the court would be an American version of the repressive British 
Star Chamber.32 Wyoming’s last Democrat elected to Congress, Teno Roncalio, voted for the 
FISA.33 Wyoming’s Republican Senators Clifford Hansen and Malcolm Wallop also voted for 
the FISA, but Senator Wallop used his time on the Senate floor to express concerns about mixing 
criminal justice and foreign affairs functions within one judicial body.34  
 
The intelligence community wanted to protect sensitive sources while actively investigating 
foreign threats; similarly, Congress wanted to facilitate those investigations while creating robust 
executive and congressional oversight. 35  Illinois Congressman Robert McClory, recognizing 
these delicate balances, proposed compromises that would maintain Fourth Amendment privacy 
protections without granting foreign adversaries too much room to operate.36 McClory emerged 
as the hero who resisted many of the proposed overreactions that would have forced the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and FBI to reveal confidential sources and compromise many of their 
best tools. Had McClory not fought such an uphill battle to protect the intelligence community, 
perhaps he could have added increased protections for both sides, especially in the form of a 
dedicated public defender.  
 
The Conference Report discussed the difficulty of monitoring communist groups:  Soviets 
increasingly recruited agents from international media and other First Amendment protected 
events in order to bypass Western monitoring. “This is a ‘Catch 22.’ How can the FBI know if a 
crime is being prepared without some surveillance?”37 Hostile adversaries took advantage of free 
world protections to shield their operations.  
 
First Amendment protected activities still offer a way to skirt monitoring, although warrants and 
executive approval can address instances of misuse of these liberties. This leads to the question 
                                                 
30  See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978),  
http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.uwyo.edu/legisinsight?id=PL95-511&type=LEG_HIST.  
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
34  124 Cong. Rec. S10,896 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1978) (statement of Sen. Wallop), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1978-pt9/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1978-pt9-1-1.pdf.  
35  See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978),  
http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.uwyo.edu/legisinsight?id=PL95-511&type=LEG_HIST. 
36 Id.  
37 Id.  
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10 
of remedies. Congress never enacted a new remedy to accompany the new FISA procedures, 
relying instead on the exclusionary rules under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments for improperly 
obtained evidence.38 These rules function well to protect defendants during criminal proceedings 
in which the judge opts to release pertinent information obtained through FISA but are of limited 
use to someone not charged with an offense. This leads to the important question of what 
remedies, if any, should be available to a person wrongly targeted for surveillance. On the one 
hand, ignorance is bliss; if a person does not even know that his or her rights have been violated, 
the intrusion likely does not impact his or her daily life. On the other hand, fundamental rights 
are sacred, and any violation, even if unknown, still leads to an erosion of civil rights. This 
explains the public outcry after the Edward Snowden leaks of information regarding National 
Security Agency bulk collection programs. While no one was prosecuted based on the general 
(metadata) information gathered, the intrusions still occurred. In contrast to the selective 
application of the FISA program, the United States Postal Service mail cover program has 
expanded post-9/11 to include most first class mail.39 While the universal coverage is shocking 
at first, citizens might be relieved to know that the program only includes the origin and 
destination information, not the internal content of the mail. Additionally, the fact that every first 
class envelope is recorded allays concerns about selective targeting. This underscores the need 
for a dedicated public defender for those individually impacted. The public at large has many 
collective remedies against the bulk collection programs when compared to defendants, who 
might be ignorant of the nature of the evidence they alone face.  
 
Executive Order 12333 provided additional guidance for the various agencies tasked with 
counterintelligence investigations and responsibilities. The Order restricted CIA searches and 
surveillance domestically and, while clarifying similar FBI responsibilities domestically, placed 
further Attorney General supervision over those sensitive FBI responsibilities. The Order 
commendably reined in human testing and government assassinations.40 The Order demonstrates 
many of the presidential functions to manage the intelligence community. He or she can direct 
agency activities, manage budgets, and set goals and restrictions. These broad powers also 
suggest the resulting limitations. Successful capacity building in an agency makes it harder to 
externally manage its increasingly autonomous activities. Similarly, that successful capacity 
building can come at the expense of other important goals, like protecting civil rights. Lastly, 
even a well-informed president may struggle to navigate the gray area between aggressive 
programs and appropriate restrictions. A dedicated public defender would challenge the 
President and Attorney General to competitively balance the interest in promoting aggressive 
investigations with the interest in protecting the accused.  
 
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF FISA 
 
Even with extensively debated legislation and carefully contemplated executive action, 
intelligence programs require judicial interpretation. For FISA and related surveillance programs, 
                                                 
38 See id.  
39  See Ron Nixon, U.S. Postal Service Logging All Mail for Law Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/us/monitoring-of-snail-mail.html (describing the mail cover process of 
recording all sender and destination information on the outside of envelopes).  
40 Exec. Order No. 12, 333, 3 C.F.R. § 200 (1981). 
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courts have instrumentally provided bright-line rules and clarification for the conduct of those 
programs. Ideally, court rulings will promote increased effectiveness of programs while 
simultaneously protecting fundamental rights at risk. Historically, federal courts mostly ruled on 
cases based upon some geographic connection to the court’s jurisdiction. Congress debated 
whether to maintain this geographic distribution or to consolidate foreign surveillance decisions 
into one court. Congress ultimately opted for a single, consolidated FISA court, in part to reduce 
the dissemination of classified information and increase security for the court. 41  Post 9/11, 
Congress doubled down on the centralized court by requiring that at least three judges live within 
20 miles of the court.42 Considering the historical alternative, each federal district court could 
have considered foreign surveillance warrants, possibly resulting in different surveillance 
standards among the circuit courts. This could have resulted in some absurd results, as, for 
instance, if different regions allowed different levels of surveillance for the same foreign 
adversary. The consolidated court progressively acknowledged the reality of interstate 
communications and the fact that threats do not stop at state lines or national borders. For 
subsequent prosecutions based on information obtained under FISA, the federal trial court 
exercises its own discretion on what FISA information to allow and what to disclose to 
defendants.43 Rather than limiting these rulings to discussions between the prosecution and the 
judge, a dedicated public defender would add a balanced perspective to these evidentiary 
motions. 
 
In 1984, members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) operating in the United States challenged 
their convictions for firearms and explosives violations, asserting that FISA was 
unconstitutionally overbroad and that evidence obtained through FISA failed to meet probable 
cause standards.44 As part of pretrial discovery, the United States provided the defendants with 
the fruits of its surveillance, including “copies of all tape recordings, transcripts, surveillance 
logs, and pen register tapes of all telephone conversations resulting from the surveillance.”45 
Based upon this information, defendants challenged the evidence: 
  
Defendants moved to suppress the fruits of the FISA surveillance on a variety of 
grounds. They contended that FISA surveillance violates a target's First, Fourth, 
and Fifth Amendment rights because it is too broad; violates the doctrine of 
separation of powers because it requires the courts to decide political questions; 
and denies due process and equal protection to aliens. In addition, defendants 
contended that the requirements set forth in FISA had not been met because an 
insufficient basis had been provided for the issuance of the surveillance order and 
because the government had failed to comply with FISA's "minimization" 
requirements. They also contended that FISA had been improperly used simply to 
obtain evidence of criminal activity rather than to protect the national security.46 
                                                 
41  See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978),  
http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.uw yo.edu/legisinsight?id=PL95-511&type=LEG_HIST.  
42 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 95 P.L. 511, 92 Stat. 1783, (codified as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 1803). 
43 See United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
44 United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984). 
45 Id. at 67. 
46 Id.   
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This challenge to the FISA actions echoed many of the concerns expressed during the legislative 
debates, particularly making the distinction between constitutionally protected and nefarious 
activities. At worst, FISA could be a weapon against unpopular political expression. In United 
States v. Duggan, the court held that based on an objective (not a subjective, political) 
consideration of IRA activities, the group fell squarely within the definition of a foreign terrorist 
group.47 The court explained how FISA complied with the Equal Protection Clause for both U.S. 
persons (citizens and certain lawful aliens) and non-U.S. persons:  
 
FISA treats United States persons, who are defined principally to include United 
States citizens and resident aliens, differently from non-United States persons. . . . 
[I]n determining whether or not a target is an agent of a foreign power, the FISA 
Judge may make an affirmative finding based solely on activities protected by the 
First Amendment if the target is a non-United States person, but not if he is a 
United States person . . . . [The] minimization precautions are required only if the 
target is a United States person.48  
 
The Duggan court cited the legislative history of FISA to explain why such a distinction had 
been incorporated into the law:  
 
[L]arge numbers of temporary aliens visit the United States and…many of these 
aliens are working for foreign intelligence networks. The Select Committee on 
Intelligence Activities similarly identified the problem, pointing out that one 
quarter of the Soviet exchange students coming to the United States in a ten-year 
period were found to be intelligence officers. This Committee is aware that less 
intrusive investigative techniques may not be able to obtain sufficient information 
about persons visiting here only for a limited time.49  
 
The Duggan court would have faced a more difficult call had the IRA members also been U.S. 
citizens. The court would have decided what scope of protection to grant controversial First 
Amendment activities. This might have been a close call had the IRA members been attending 
church services or handing out pamphlets. Instead, the IRA’s attempts to ship firearms and 
explosives would still fall more within the criminal realm (illegal regardless of the motivations) 
than the free expression realm. In this case, the court erred on the side of releasing sensitive 
information to defendants to enable their challenges, even though it ultimately ruled against the 
defendants. As an alternative, had a cleared public defender reviewed the information obtained 
under FISA, that official could have made the same challenges without revealing sensitive 
methods and sources to IRA members. 
 
In 1988, the FBI identified Armenian operatives traveling from Los Angeles to Philadelphia to 
attack the Turkish consulate. Unable to discern the names or exact itineraries of the operatives, 
the FBI failed to secure a warrant and only located their explosives in checked baggage arriving 
                                                 
47 Id. at 74-75. 
48 Id. at 75.  
49 Id. at 76. 
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to Philadelphia using canine and x-ray detection. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that exigent 
circumstances applied and that no warrant could have been realistically obtained given the 
evolving threat. 50  In the resulting case, United States v. Sarkissian, the court declined to 
determine whether the primary purpose of the investigation was a foreign intelligence matter 
governed by FISA or if it had evolved into a criminal matter governed by Title III. The court 
held instead that a foreign intelligence investigation could lead into related criminal matters, 
ruling, “FISA is meant to take into account ‘the differences between ordinary criminal 
investigations to gather evidence of specific crimes and foreign counterintelligence 
investigations to uncover and monitor clandestine activities.’” 51  The court wisely avoided 
making such a distinction, as broad foreign intelligence investigations of hostile groups generally 
lead to criminal prosecutions as a remedy to imprison or deport foreign agents.  
 
The Sarkissian court also addressed the issue of “graymail”––where defendants force the 
government to drop a charge in order protect classified information or to pursue the charge and 
expose that underlying sensitive information––holding that the Classified Information 
Procedures Act (CIPA) allows a judge to make initial determinations through ex parte and in 
camera proceedings.52 This procedure gave great weight to the government’s initial certifications 
that the matter concerned foreign intelligence activities. However, that certification was still 
confirmed by the trial judge without releasing the information to the defendants.53 A dedicated 
public defender would better achieve the aims of the CIPA, allowing the defender to make 
vigorous motions on behalf of the defendants without revealing classified information to the 
defendants themselves and their hostile groups. The public defender would also decrease the 
burden on intelligence agencies to disclose information, offer plea deals, or sacrifice more 
challenging prosecutions based on concerns about disclosing sensitive investigative techniques.54  
 
In United States v. Bin Laden, the court considered whether Fourth Amendment protections 
applied to a US citizen likely involved with Al Qaeda and living in Kenya, holding that, while 
the Fourth Amendment still applied, it would not have been realistic to obtain a warrant to search 
the Kenyan safe house.55 Even though the Attorney General approved of the overall operation 
targeting Al-Qaeda, the court ruled that the telephonic surveillance was illegal because a warrant 
should have specified the likely U.S. citizen targeted in Kenya. Despite the technical violation, 
the court still allowed the evidence because excluding it was unlikely to deter similar future 
conduct and the surveillance had been conducted in good faith. 56  This was a high stakes 
decision. Had the court applied the exclusionary rule, it would have deterred future surveillance 
of Al Qaeda and similar terrorist groups. That outcome––limiting surveillance––would be 
contrary to aggressively responding to such growing threats. Rather than risking this all or 
nothing remedy of excluding evidence, a cleared public defender would provide another view on 
the fruits of the surveillance short of excluding it entirely. Bin Laden was also the first FISA case 
                                                 
50 United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 963-964 (9th Cir. 1988).  
51 Id. at 695.  
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 964. 
54 See e.g. Ari Shapiro, As Domestic Spying Rises, Some Prosecutions Drop, NPR (July 11, 2008); Cedric Logan, 
The FISA Wall and Federal Investigations, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & Liberty 209 (2009).   
55 See United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  
56 See id. at 264.  
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to consider whether a physical search of an overseas residence also fell within the scope of the 
national security exception to the Fourth Amendment. The court held that the residential search 
was permissible based on the government’s showing of special need and reasonable scope.57  
 
In United States v. Abu-Jihaad, Abu-Jihaad (formerly Paul Raphael Hall who ominously 
changed his legal name to “father of the Jihad” before enlisting in the United States Navy) was 
convicted of providing material support to terrorist groups and unauthorized disclosure of 
national defense information. Abu-Jihaad challenged the conviction, claiming that the FISA 
information obtained was primarily for the criminal investigation and not primarily for foreign 
intelligence purposes. Discussing PATRIOT Act updates to the FISA, the court ruled against 
Abu-Jihaad, holding that FISA only requires “a significant [foreign intelligence] purpose”:  
 
Among other things, Congress indicated that it did not, in fact, require foreign 
intelligence gathering to be the primary purpose of the requested surveillance to 
obtain a FISA warrant. Rather, upon satisfaction of all other FISA requirements, 
Congress authorized FISA Court judges to issue warrants upon executive 
certification that acquisition of foreign intelligence information is "a significant 
purpose" of the requested surveillance.58 
  
The court also denied Abu-Jihaad’s request to review the evidence against him obtained under 
FISA, claiming that existing FISA and CIPA procedures adequately protected the defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment Rights:  
 
FISA warrant applications are subject to "minimal scrutiny by the courts," both 
upon initial presentation and subsequent challenge . . . . [I}n reviewing those 
submissions ex parte and in camera . . . the orders did not deny Abu-Jihaad any 
information helpful or material to his defense.59  
 
Rather than relying on the judge’s word that the surveillance information did not contain 
anything helpful to the case, a cleared public defender could have reviewed all of the materials 
on behalf of the defendant and argued to exclude any questionable evidence. Even if the public 
defender’s review and subsequent motions fail to persuade the judge to exclude the evidence, the 
adversarial approach would ensure a more balanced proceeding, instead of deferring to the 
prosecution and judge entirely.  
 
In 2010, the FBI arrested ten suspected, undeclared Russian agents operating in the United 
States.60 In the published criminal complaints against the suspects, the affiant agent detailed 
some of the investigative methods used against the Russians, including intercepting Wi-Fi 
                                                 
57See id. at 285.   
58United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 119 (2d Cir. 2010).   
59 Id. at 130; Id. at 143. 
60 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Ten Alleged Secret Agents Arrested in the United States: Multi-year FBI 
Investigation Uncovers Network in the United States Tasked with Recruiting Sources and Collecting Information for 
Russia (June 28, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ten-alleged-secret-agents-arrested-united-states.  
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transmissions and conducting physical surveillance; and while not mentioning the nature of the 
previous search warrants obtained, revealed the ultimate fruits of the surveillance:  
 
The SVR [Russian external intelligence agency] has spelled out the purpose of the 
Illegals' presence in America in a 2009 message to DEFENDANT#2, a/k/a 
"Richard Murphy" and DEFENDANT #3, a/k/a "Cynthia Murphy," the 
defendants. That message, which was sent by Moscow Center, has been decrypted 
by the FBI and reads, in part, as follows:   
 
You were sent to USA for long-term service trip. Your education, bank accounts, 
car, house etc.—all these serve one goal: fulfill your main mission, i.e. to search 
and develop ties in policymaking circles in US and send intels [intelligence 
reports] to C[enter].61 
   
The information revealed from the criminal complaint demonstrated that the current FISA 
warrant system worked as intended by Congress and subsequent interpreting cases. Agents can 
either obtain a criminal warrant through a federal magistrate or through a judge assigned to the 
FISC. The affiant did not note which process she elected; however, the fact that a federal 
magistrate ultimately reviewed the information obtained from the surveillance demonstrated the 
additional safeguards triggered following a magistrate’s or a FISC ruling. 
 
While it is troubling that the criminal complaint revealed so much about sensitive 
counterintelligence methods (surveillance locations, times, targets, agents, techniques), those 
revelations answered the concern about the ex parte nature of FISC proceedings. Publicized 
criminal complaints put future suspects on notice of potential surveillance. Finally, even the 
published criminal complaint stopped short of the publicity that a trial would have brought to this 
investigation. A trial would have allowed the defendants to cross-examine their accusers and 
devote more attention to the sensitive techniques deployed. Ultimately, the defendants pleaded 
guilty to failing to register as foreign agents, which spared further exposure for both the United 
States and Russia.62 Even with this favorable outcome, a public defender could have facilitated 
the process of obtaining guilty pleas from the Russian agents and expedited the deportation 
process. Allowing a public defender to represent America’s enemies would increase the 
credibility of court proceedings as truly impartial regardless of the parties involved.  
 
This favorable plea bargain and deportation outcome raises an important brinksmanship 
hypothetical question: To what extent would the Justice Department reveal sensitive FISA 
procedures and investigative techniques if a foreign entity challenged an arrest at trial? In 
Sarkissian, the court allowed a “graymail” exception for the government to keep sensitive 
materials separate from the rest of information provided to defendants. In an analogous situation 
outside of the FISA context, the Justice Department recently advised state and local governments 
                                                 
61 Criminal Complaint from Press Release, US Dep’t of Justice, Ten Alleged Secret Agents Arrested in United 
States: Multi-year FBI Investigation Uncovers Network in the United States Tasked with Recruiting Sources and 
Collecting Information for Russia (June 25, 2010).  
62  See Washington and Russia Agree to Swap Intelligence Gatherers, CNN (July 9, 2010), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/ 07/08/russian.spy.hearings.  
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using the Stingray device (a cellular tower replicator that precisely locates suspects) to either 
obtain a plea deal or drop the charges rather than revealing further information about the device 
in court. 63  The Justice Department has likely been hesitant to reveal details of the new 
technology to unscrupulous defense attorneys and criminal enterprises. In the realm of FISA, 
channeling information to a designated public defender would remove the risks associated with 
releasing pertinent but classified information to private attorneys and hostile foreign groups. 
 
FISA REFORMS HAVE FALLEN SHORT 
 
Unusually bipartisan-acting Congresses have been responsive to public concerns about FISA. 
The PATRIOT Act updated FISA for a post-9/11 world, including provisions for lone wolf 
suspects operating outside of foreign hostile groups.64 Congress has even considered the role of a 
public advocate to represent the public interest in bulk collection programs. 65  This public 
advocate remedy falls short in two distinct ways. First, the three branches of government should 
reform FISA though amendments, executive orders, and court decisions. The government should 
act through Constitutional means, not by relegating these larger policy questions to a public czar. 
Secondly, instead of a public advocate in a general sense, justice through individual FISA 
prosecutions would be better served by a designated public defender acting in a specific capacity 
on behalf on defendants. Rather than arguing for changes to the law, that public defender would 
make sure that defendants are best represented under the law as it currently stands. Not only 
would that enable defendants to make the best arguments against controversial evidence, but it 
would limit the government’s disclosure of sensitive law enforcement operations in open court 
proceedings.  
 
Federal district courts have recently allowed private defense attorneys to obtain an interim 
security clearance in order to review classified materials on behalf of their clients. In at least one 
case, this has led to disastrous results where the Government released boxes of classified 
information without proper review and the receiving attorney (despite having an interim security 
clearance) refused to return the extraneous materials.66 In this case, a regularly cleared public 
defender could have located the relevant documents for the defendant’s case while promptly 
returning the extraneous classified materials to the originating agency. Similarly, some scholars 
have suggested that the solution lies in the Government declassifying documents for use in open 
court.67 This knee-jerk reaction to rapidly declassify court materials would unnecessarily delay 
criminal proceedings and surrender the core FISA compromise of safeguarding sensitive 
                                                 
63 See Ellen Nakashima, Secrecy Around Police Surveillance Equipment Proves a Case’s Undoing, WASH POST., 
Feb. 22, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secrecy-around-police- surveillance-
equipment-proves-a-cases-undoing/2015/02/22/ce72308a-b7ac-11e4-aa05-1ce812b3fdd2_story.html. 
64Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
Act of2001, 107 P.L. 56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).   
65Andrew Nolan, et. al., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Reform of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts: 
Introducing a Public   Advocate, Congressional Research Service (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R43260.pdf.  
66 See Greg Krikorian, Secret Data Exposed in Terrorism Case: Federal officials erred in releasing intelligence 
documents to an Islamic charity's defense team, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2006, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/feb/16/natio n/na-error16. 
67  See Serrin Turner & Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Secrecy Problem in Terrorism Trials (June 7, 2005), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/secrecy-problem-terrorism-trials.   
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investigative information while protecting personal liberties. A dedicated public defender would 
better reconcile the competing goals of parties under FISA.  
 
All three branches of government have been responsive to public concerns and possible areas of 
reform for FISA. In stark contrast internationally, the consolidated French surveillance 
establishment routinely ignores requests from Parliament for programmatic information. 68 
Similarly, Sweden’s consolidated surveillance establishment has been doubly weak in both 
conducting investigations and protecting public privacy interests.69 Thanks to carefully crafted 
FISA legislation, enabling executive orders, and evolving judicial interpretations, the United 
States has increasingly achieved two opposing (but not mutually exclusive) goals: aggressive 
surveillance of foreign targets and robust public protections. Adding a dedicated federal public 
defender for FISA prosecutions would further strengthen both original goals of the program: 
protecting constitutional rights and enabling a proactive law enforcement response to foreign 
threats. 
                                                 
68  See Foreign Intelligence Gathering Laws: France, Library of Congress (Sept. 27, 2016), 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/intelligence-activities/france.php.  
69  See Foreign Intelligence Gathering Laws: Sweden, Library of Congress (Sept. 27, 2016), 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/intelligence-activities/sweden.php. 
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